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ARGUMENT
L

THE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL POSSIBLE INFERENCES OF
NEGLIGENCE. BUT ONLY PROVE THAT THE BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES
WEIGH IN FAVOR OF NEGLIGENCE1
The Statement of Facts in Defendant's Brief highlights a misunderstanding of the

standard of review to be applied in this case, as well as the standard which the trial court should
have applied below. In regard to whether an instruction of res ipsa loquitur should be given at
all, the Utah Supreme Court in Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828, 833-34 (Utah 1980)
stated:
It is to be noted that the weighing of evidence presented to establish the [elements
of res ipsa loquitur], like all other questions of fact, is within the provence of the
jury; where the trial court determines that the evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, could establish the prerequisites to the application of the
doctrine, an instruction to that effect is proper.
Thus, the evidence in this case need not compel an application of res ipsa loquitur; the evidence
must only provide some basis for its application.
Likewise, in reviewing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court
must view all the testimony and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in plaintiff's favor
and must disregard all conflicting evidence. The judgment notwithstanding the verdict may only
be sustained in the absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict. Coer v. Mavfair

fallow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1985); See accord. Judge Boyd L. Park
at the trial of the present matter: "Well, I don't think to get to a res ipsa case that you have to
rule out everything in the world." R.1017, See Addendum D in Appellant's principle brief.
1

Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). Accordingly, when the defendant claims that
plaintiff is misconstruing, misinterpreting, or taking comments out of context, all such analysis
only addresses the weight to be given to the evidence. In the current posture of this case,
however, all conflicting evidence must be disregarded.

It must be assumed that the jury

accepted the interpretation which the plaintiff gave to the testimony and evidence cited in her
brief.
Defendant's contention that comments made by witnesses constituted speculation
or conjecture, or were somehow explained away by witnesses proves nothing. There is no issue
on appeal as to admissibility of any evidence. Instead, the jury was free to look at the evidence
which was admitted, whether speculative or not. Thus, when Dr. Parish speaking for Parish
Chemical admitted facts which raised an inference of negligence by virtue of res ipsa loquitur,
the jury was at liberty to rely on that statement. Dr. Parish answered that it was fair to state
that the fire either had to start in one of two ways: either someone went into Stockroom A and
started the fire intentionally or there was an improper storage of the chemicals. (R.933-34).
Again, Dr. Parish's attempts to back off of this statement go to the evidence's weight, not to its
probative value, and certainly cannot be brushed aside when the issue before this court is
whether a prima facie case had been made out. There was no evidence of arson. Thus, by
Parish's own admission, with arson discounted, the only other cause of the fire was negligence.

2

IL

THE ACCIDENT OR INJURY IN THIS CASE WAS CAUSED BY A
FORCE THAT WAS CONTROLLED ONLY BY THE DEFENDANT IN THAT
DEFENDANT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL LIKELY CAUSES OF
THE ACCIDENT OR INJURY2
Defendant claims that plaintiffs claim fails allegedly because was unable to trace

a cause of the fire to an instrument for which the defendant was responsible, citing Barnhill v.
Young Electric Sign Co., 374 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1962). This holding by the Barnhill court
must be reconciled with subsequent statements of the Utah Supreme Court regarding res ipsa
loquitur. For example, in Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980), the court
explained:
It is often the case that a plaintiff, while suffering injury which was caused by a
force or agency allegedly instigated by defendant's conduct, is unable to produce
evidence pinpointing a given act or omission on the part of defendant which
breached illegally imposed standard of care. Where this is the case, the law
permits a plaintiff to withdraw from the specific conduct constituting negligence,
and concentrate upon presenting evidence probative of circumstances which would
permit the trier of fact to infer the defendant had engaged in negligent conduct to
the injury of the plaintiff.
Id. at 833 (emphasis added). Thus, a plaintiff does not have to pinpoint, or trace with
particularity, the given act or omission on the part of the defendant which breached his duty.
Instead, the plaintiff, as she did in this case, is only required to present evidence probative of

2

Second element of res ipsa loquitur as found in Model Utah Jury Instruction 4.1. See
Dallev v. Utah Valley Regional Med. Cntr.. 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990); Ballow v. Monroe. 699
P.2d 719 (Utah 1985); Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984);
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care.
Inc.. 740 P.2d 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
3

circumstances upon which a jury might infer negligence. A reading of the evidence, in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff, evidences that the plaintiff did in fact present evidence probative
of the circumstances which would permit the trier of fact to infer that defendant had engaged in
negligent conduct. Obviously the jury came to this conclusion. The jury in this case found
Parish Chemical negligent.
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated in 1985 in Ballow v. Monroe. 699 P.2d 719,
722 (Utah 1985), that a plaintiff need not eliminate all possible inferences of non-negligence,
but only prove the balance of probabilities weigh in favor of negligence. It is absurd under a
theory of res ipsa loquitur to contend that a plaintiff must show exactly what happened in order
to go forward. If the plaintiff could show the actual act which caused the accident, res ipsa
loquitur not only would not be required, but would be disallowed. Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984).
On two separate occasions, this court has considered the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and has held:
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which allows a party, in certain
circumstances, to raise an inference that another party has acted negligently,
notwithstanding a lack of evidence concerning the other party's actions.
Kitchen v. CalGas Co.. Inc.. 821 P.2d 458, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(emphasis added).
Further, this court has stated that the "application of res ipsa loquitur presupposes a plaintiff's
inability to point to a specific allegedly negligent act which caused the injury." Hornsbv v.
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d 929, 934 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
4

Addressing this second element of res ipsa loquitur, the Utah Supreme Court in
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992) held:
The second element, exclusivity of management or control, should not be rigidly
applied. Rather, that element should focus on the degree of a defendant's
management or control necessary to provide a persuasive inference of liability on
the defendant's part.
In other words, something less than exclusive management or control may suffice to make out
a prima facie case of res ipsa loquitur. To establish the second requirement, the plaintiff need
only show "that it is more likely than not that the defendant was the party responsible for the
injury."

IdL at 862, citing Ballow, 699 P.2d at 721. Rather than restate the evidence as

provided in plaintiff's principle brief, plaintiff will defer to the trial court's statement while the
evidence was fresh in the trial court's conscience:
There is no question that Parish Chemical had control of the building, had control
of the chemicals, had set up a variety of safety features to prevent people from
interloping on the property to prevent stealing, to prevent accidents of any kind.
There is no question about that they have done that. That means then that is
strictly within their control. That those chemicals do not erupt and they do not
have a force of fire and whether there is an explosion or not may be or may be
not, but there has to be a source in which the fire can go in order to continue.
That source obviously was in that room.
(R.1016, See Addendum D in Plaintiff's principle brief). At no time did Parish Chemical or
its employees relinquish control of the building to any persons prior to the fire. Thus, exclusive
control was established and the instrumentality causing the damage in this case, the chemicals,
was identified. The chemicals were the only materials that could burn in the stockroom, and
whether ignition was by blow torch, spark, burning light ballast, or otherwise, the
5

instrumentality under the defendant's control which caused the problem was the chemicals
themselves.
Defendant contends: "Res ipsa loquitur has no application in the absence of
evidence showing what instrumentality caused the fire."

See Defendant's Brief at 25.

Defendant's statement ignores recent Utah Supreme Court law. In Dallev v. Utah Valley
Regional Medical Ctr.. 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case
where a patient brought a medical malpractice suit due to a burn to her leg which occurred
during surgery. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the defendants upon the basis
that the plaintiff had not shown through expert testimony that the accident was of a kind which
would not normally occur absent negligence,3 and had further failed to establish what
instrumentality caused the burn. IcL at 195. Additionally, the plaintiff admitted that she did not
know which of the defendants had actually caused the burn. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed holding:
A better-reasoned approach would be to allow a plaintiff to use either of two
methods to prove causation: A plaintiff may prove causation either by tracing the
injury "to a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was
responsible" or by showing "that the defendant was responsible for all reasonably
probable causes to which the accident could be attributed. . . . Many cases have
allowed the plaintiffs to make such a showing through circumstantial evidence by
using res ipsa loquitur."

3

This is the same claim that the defendants in me present case are making. Defendant
claims that plaintiff cannot base her claim upon res ipsa loquitur absent expert testimony. As
will be explained hereafter, the plaintiff showed circumstantial evidence upon which a lay person
could reasonably conclude that this fire would probably not have occurred absent negligence.
6

Id. at 197(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court buttressed its holding by the example of
Shannon v. Jailer, 217 N.E.2d 234 (1966) which held "that the term 'instrumentality,' when
used in connection with a res ipsa loquitur case, has a much broader meaning than a specific
object or thing and could include an agency or occurrence.ff IdL at 198. In the present matter,
therefore, the plaintiff has proven her case under both methods allowed in Dallev for res ipsa
loquitur cases. Plaintiff traced her injury as resulting from the smoke emitted by Stockroom A
and the chemicals stored there.

These chemicals were the only combustible materials in

Stockroom A. At the very least, plaintiff showed that the defendant was responsible for all
reasonably probable causes for the fire. As a result, the case was properly submitted to the jury,
whose verdict should be reinstated.
It should be noted that the court in Dallev concluded:
Once the plaintiff has utilized res ipsa loquitur to establish the inference that no
one but defendant ] could have had control of the instrumentality that caused the
injury, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to [the defendant] to
show that the injury could have been caused by a person or instrumentality
outside of defendant's control.
Id. at 199(emphasis added). In this case, Parish Chemical did not carry this burden as is
reflected by the jury's verdict.
In support of the Barnhill statement that the plaintiff must trace the cause of the
fire to a specific instrumentality for which the defendant was responsible, the plaintiff, as well
as the court in Barnhill, places emphasis on Emigh v. Andrews, 191 P.2d 901 (Kan. 1948). It
should be noted that the defendant also places emphasis on other cases concerning Kansas law,
7

such as Appalachian Ins. Co. v. G.B. Knutson, 242 F.Supp. 226 (W.D. Mo. 1965), which also
relies on the Emigh decision.
However, the Kansas Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court of Utah, has not
been silence since the Emigh decision. Just as the Utah Supreme Court has more clearly defined
the bounds of res ipsa loquitur since the Barnhill decision, the Kansas Supreme Court has made
numerous statements since Emigh. In Primm v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 249 P.2d 647
(Kan. 1952), an explosion occurred inside a power plant. The plaintiff pleaded that he was
working as a brick layer at the plant; that the plant produced electricity by burning gas, oil, and
coal; that the plant, boilers, buildings, and equipment were under the exclusive control of the
defendant; that an explosion occurred in the room where the plaintiff was working, and that the
explosion occurred because of "gaseous fumes and vapors the exact content of which was
unknown to plaintiff."
The defendant in Primm denied the explosions were due to any fault or negligence
or that it had any knowledge as to the cause of the explosions, and instead "alleged the
explosions constituted an accident for which it was in no way responsible," much like Parish has
done in this case. A trial court granted the defendant's Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas stated:
As we understand its brief, appellee's contentions in support of the trial court's
ruling rest primarily on its contention the only thing pleaded is that an explosion
occurred and that the mere happening thereof furnished no basis for a
presumption of negligence, citing (several cases including Emigh); and other
authorities which so hold; and its further contention that the petitions do not plead
8

any initial or foundation fact, as for instance, that the boiler exploded; that the
sole allegation is there was an explosion speaks for itself, and that such pleading
is insufficient under the Emigh case, supra, where it was held that a failure to
plead an initial or foundation fact left the petition insufficient. Expanding its
argument that there must have been an instrumentality or thing under the
defendant's exclusive control which caused the injury, appellee says that it will
not be contended that its buildings were instrumentalities, but that all that is
alleged is that the buildings exploded or not that something in the buildings
exploded, but that it is not alleged what exploded. In our opinion, this argument
overlooks or ignores the plain allegation that gaseous fumes and vapors
exploded.4 Appellee says further that if the explosion resulted from gas, there
would have been no explosion without the gas being ignited, and the court is
going to have to assume there was an emission and what caused it and that this
may not be done . . . it must be apparent that if plaintiff knew what ignited the
gas they would have been in a position to allege specific acts of negligence and
the doctrine would then not be applicable.
Id. at 642 (emphasis added). The Primm court concluded by saying:
In our opinion the circumstances pleaded are such that if the proof on trial
established their existence [that the building exploded], a prime facie case for
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would have been made.
Id. at 653. In this case, if the plaintiff knew what ignited the chemicals and how that ignition
was accomplished, the plaintiff would have been in a position to allege specific acts of
negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not be applicable to the present case.
Thus, even the Emigh court, on which the Barnhill case is founded, recognizes that when a party
must trace the cause of a fire to an instrumentality, one is not talking about specific acts,
including what ignited the chemicals in this case.
Similarly, the Kansas court clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Kansas

4

Much like plaintiff's current allegations that chemicals burned.
9

in Kitchen v. Smith, 334 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1959). In Kitchen, the plaintiff alleged that a hay
bailer "caused matters of a combustible quantity" to come into contact with the prairie grass and
start a fire. On appeal, the issue was whether the allegations in the amended complaint stated
a cause of action. The defendant argued that there are many items that can be considered
combustible, "and that none of these items coming in contact with the prairie hay, not being in
a state of combustion themselves, would ignite and cause a fire." IcL at 415. Accordingly, the
defendant argued, the allegations precluded any finding that the defendant caused the fire.5 The
defendant in Kitchen went on to cite Emigh in his brief, arguing that if the plaintiff had alleged
that sparks from a tractor caused the hay to ignite, he would have come within the rule. The
Kansas Supreme Court replied that Emigh is good law, "where it has application." The obvious
implication of this statement being that Emigh does not apply to every case and every fact
pattern. The Kitchen court went on to say:
It is clear that it is sufficient to establish a prime facie case based on res ipsa
loquitur without stating in general allegations, hereunder attack, the means by
which the bailer unit caused the fire. In this respect it was sufficient to allege
that the hay bailer unit started the fire which damaged the plaintiff in the
particulars alleged.
Id. at 418-19. The court concluded its analysis and supported its position by quoting from
Primm v. Kansas, already discussed. Thus, this court should note the Kansas Supreme Court
itself has held that the Emigh decision is not controlling in every fact pattern, including fire

interestingly, this is the exact same argument the defendant in this case makes on page
7 of its brief in its "Fact" statement.
10

cases.
Finally, in Rudy v. Whalev, 360 P.2d 863 (Kan. 1961), the Kansas Supreme
Court followed its decision in Kitchen. In Rudy, a gas transport truck caught fire while off
loading and a plaintiff's gas station burned to the ground. The plaintiff alleged that the transport
caught fire and that the fire from the truck and the tanks caught the gas station on fire. The
plaintiff also alleged that it was impossible to determine the exact point of origin of the fire,
"except that it was in the immediate vicinity of the transport and tanks. . . " IcL at 867. Not
surprisingly, the defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed "to allege the thing or
instrumentality, namely, the truck, caused the damage; that it was a matter of conjecture whether
the fire was caused by the instrumentality or whether the fire resulted from some other cause."
Id. The defendants in Rudy, just like the defendants in the present case, cited Emigh. Using
almost exactly the same language as the Kansas Supreme Court did in Kitchen, the court
concluded,
It is clear that the petition is sufficient to establish a prima facie case based on res
ipsa loquitur without alleging generally the means by which the transport truck
caught on fire. In this respect, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant's truck
unit caught on fire and that the fire from the same caught the service station of
the plaintiff's on fire, burning it to the ground.
Id, at 868.
In sum, defendant's position that the present matter is not amenable to an
application of res ipsa loquitur does not reflect Utah law as embodied by Dalley, nor does it
even comport with Kansas law upon which the defendant ostensibly relies. Under the present
11

circumstances as shown by the evidence, the trial court committed error in granting the
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The jury's verdict should be reinstated.
IIL

THE FIRE AT PARISH CHEMICAL WAS OF A KIND WHICH DOES NOT
OCCUR ABSENT NEGLIGENCE
The plaintiff in this case did not stand before the jury and say: "No one knows

how this fire started and therefore you must find for me." Instead, the plaintiff put on exacting
testimony showing the jury what chemicals were stored in the room and outlining the entire
construction of the room. Based upon that evidence, the jury was able to make a determination
as to whether a fire in this room, under the circumstances of this case, would have been the kind
of fire to start absent negligence.
Plaintiff cites in her original brief the case of Olswanger v. Funk, 470 S.W. 2d
13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970), as a demonstration of the correct way to analyze the first res ipsa
element.

Defendant brushes aside this case writing "this was a 'couch fire' case."

See

Defendant's brief at 20. Defendant's distinction is specious. In fact, defendant's argument
highlights how the plaintiff in this case in fact established the first element of res ipsa loquitur.
Just as the Olswanger case was a "couch fire" case, the present case was a "chemical storage
room fire" case. What these cases highlight is that in both instances, the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the fires should be reviewed in making a determination of whether
they are fires which normally would occur absent negligence. One cannot simply throw up their
hands and say: "This case involved a fire, therefore res ipsa loquitur is not applicable."
12

Instead, the circumstances of each case individually must be examined. Here, the
jury applied common sense and personal experience to come to the conclusion that steel shelves,
metal lathe, plaster, cinder block, and reinforced concrete do not burn.6 The jury must have
believed the Parish Chemical plant manager who was in charge of safety when he explained that
there were no electrical motors, no lab equipment, reactor vessels, heaters or baseboard heaters
or similar appliances in Stockroom A.7 Finally, the jury must have respected the learned
opinion of Wesley Parish, Phd., when he explained: "[T]he only sources for the fire . . . in the
building, were the chemicals themselves and their potentially reactive capabilities." (R. 936).
Thus, plaintiff had shown evidence probative of circumstances which would permit the trier of
fact to infer that the defendant had engaged in negligent conduct.
The sum and substance of plaintiff's case is that absent negligence, there would
not have been a fire. As the trial court below recognized:
Now how the fire got to that source [the chemicals] without there being some
spillage is really, in my mind, an impossibility. If there is no spillage of any of
the chemicals or if there was no explosion to blow the chemicals off the shelves
so that they can be broken and then exposed, the then only other way is, in my
view, is that there has to be some inference of negligence in which these
chemicals were made available to some source which triggered the fire some
ignition source whether it was inside the room or whether it was outside of the
room. The fire burned there and in my view this then becomes a res ipsa case,
o.k.

6

The construction of Stockroom A was established at R. 848, 920-21.

7

See Mark Karamesines testimony at R. 847.
13

(R. 1016-17), See Addendum D in Plaintiffs principle brief. Since there are not numerous other
possible causes for the fire at Parish Chemical, res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Cf. Barnhill v.
Young Electric Sign Co., 13 Utah 2d 347, 374 P.2d 311 (1962)(numerous other possible causes
identified).
Defendant's citation of Victoria Park Apartments, Inc. v. Axelson. 367 N.W.2d
155 (N.D. 1985) exposes the weakness in defendant's logic. In Victoria Park one of three
persons was found to have probably left a cigarette on a couch which started a fire, but the
plaintiff did not know exactly who left the cigarette. The controlling distinction to be made is
that applied to the present case, all three persons would have been employees of Parish Chemical
and thus within Parish's control. In sum, the facts upon which Victoria Park rested are not
present in the present matter. Moreover, the analysis in Victoria Park begs the question. If the
plaintiff could tell the jury who threw the cigarette which came in contact with the couch, res
ipsa loquitur would not apply.
There simply exists no presumption against the application of res ipsa loquitur
when the case involves a fire.8 Instead, this court should recognize that no Utah court has ever

8

For cases applying res ipsa loquitur to fires, see Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
Midgett. 116 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1941); Pine Ford. Inc. v. Shankle. 528 S.W. 2d 392 (Ark.
1975); Megee v. Reed. 482 S.W. 2d 832 (Ark. 1972); Oakdale Building Corp. v. Smithereen
Co.. 54 N.E. 2d 231 (111. Ct. App. 1944); Cox v. Stafford. 460 S.W. 2d 818 (Ky. 1970);
Commonwealth v. Montour Transport Co.. 73 A.2d 659 (Penn. 1950); Olswanger v. Funk. 470
S.W. 2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970); Southern Gas Corp. v. Brooks. 359 S.W. 2d 570 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1961).
14

made any statement that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable when a fire is involved.9
This court should follow common sense, past Utah cases, and the court in Olswanger v. Funk,
470 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970) where the court stated:
Counsel for defendant cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions, many of
which deny the application of [res ipsa loquitur] in fire cases, but it is apparent
from an examination of these cases that the courts hold, in the last analysis, that
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or lack of application, must of
necessity depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 15. "[W]hether a fire case falls within the operation and scope of the res ipsa loquitur
rule must of necessity depend upon the particular facts and circumstances appearing in the
individual case." Id at 15-16 citing Menth v. Breeze Corp., 73 A.2d 183, 186 (N.J. 1950).
When the particular circumstances of this case are reviewed, this court will find
that the foundation for res ipsa loquitur was established. The jury properly decided whether a
room full of chemicals all in sealed containers would burn if due care had been used. Plaintiff
established to a reasonable degree the absence of other causes of the fire. Thus, plaintiff did
establish that the fire at Parish Chemical was not the kind of fire which ordinarily occurs absent
negligence.

9

Ballow v.Monroe, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985); Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co..
5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956); Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Co.. 13 Utah 2d 347, 374
P.2d211 (1962).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima
facie case and provide the necessary foundation for res ipsa loquitur. Thus, the court should not
have thrown out the jury's verdict which found Parish Chemical negligent under the
circumstances and that its negligence caused the damages that the plaintiff suffered. The trial
court's order granting defendant's judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be reversed, and
the verdict of the jury should be reinstated.
DATED AND SIGNED this 27^day

DAVn3~&. MORTENSEN
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of December, 1995.
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